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LECTURE
Celebrating (?) the Bill of Rights: The
Root, Branch, and Foliage of American
Liberty*
By NoimAN DORSEN**
Except during the nine months- before he draws
his first breath, no man manages his affairs as
well as a tree does.
George Bernard Shaw***
Everyone knows that on December 15, 1991, the United States
will commemorate the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, the first
ten amendments to the Constitution. We may view this historic
document as an appendix, but unlike the human appendix the Bill
of Rights was necessary for survival. This is because a ntfmber of
states made it clear that they would not ratify the original Consti-
tution without more protection for the liberties of the people.'
The question for us today is, where is the country now, on the
eve of this great anniversary? Are the facts worthy of the celebra-
tion? Or is there cause for concern rather than applause at the
degree of faithfulness, or faithlessness, to the plan for human
liberty that the Bill of Rights represents?
* This is an edited and embellished version of the first Oberst Human Rights Fund
Lecture, delivered at the University of Kentucky College of Law on October 23, 1991.
** Stokes Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. President, American
Civil Liberties Union 1976-1991. B.A. 1950, Columbia University; LL.B. 1953, Harvard
University.
I thank my colleague Burt Neuborne for his valuable ideas on the structure and content
of this paper, the early portion of which was adapted from my essay Civil Liberties, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMEmIcAN CONSTITUTION 263 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
Lee Michaelson provided useful research assistance with this material.
*** W.H. AUDEN, THE VmNo BooK op ApHoRiss; A PERsoNAL SELECTION, BY W.H.
AUDEN AND Louis KRONENEERGER 383 (1962).
1 See BnmARD ScwARTz, THE GREAT RIGHTs oF MAINx 119-159 (1977).
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Before reaching a conclusion on these questions, it is necessary
to do three things. We must first consider what concept is embraced
by the Bill of Rights and, more generally, civil liberty. Civil liberty
has been broadly defined as "the great end of all human society
and government.., that state in which each individual has the
power to pursue his own happiness according to his own views of
his interest, and the dictates of his conscience, unrestrained, except
by equal, just, and impartial laws." ' 2 From a practical perspective,
civil liberties are usually claims of right that a citizen may assert
against the state. They provide a logical corollary to the concepts
of limited government and rule of law. When government acts
arbitrarily, it infringes civil liberty; the rule of law combats and
confines such abuse of power. The maxim "government of laws,
not of men" reflects this principle.
Although civil liberties are usually associated in practice with
democratic forms of government, liberty and democracy are dis-
tinct concepts. An authoritarian structure of government may rec-
ognize certain limits on the state's power to interfere with individual
autonomy. Correspondingly, the idea that an individual may assert
rights against the expressed will of the majority is at least super-
ficially counter-democratic. Thus, civil liberty does not refer to a
particular form of political system, but to the relationship between
the individual and the state, however the state is organized.
Though lacking the breadth of international human rights, civil
liberties in the United States are equally based on the integrity and
dignity of the individual. Their spirit was expressed by Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis:
The makers of our Constitution... recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect....
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 3
Individual rights frequently oppose the express will of the com-
munity when such will subordinates liberty out of concern for
order, national security, efficiency, aesthetics, or other govern-
mental interests. There are two principal justifications for prefer-
ring individual liberties to these community interests-justice and
2 GEORGE SARSWOOD, 1 SHAxsWOOD's BLAcKsTON's C6MMENTARIES 127 n.8 (1881).
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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self-interest. Justice requires norms by which persons in authority
should treat those subject to their power; self-interest invites the
recognition that, if principle is to govern, our own rights are secure
only if the rights of others are protected.
Because these justifications are abstractions to most people,
civil liberties often are subordinated in practice to more immediate
concerns of the state or to prevailing opinion. In the United States,
even administrations relatively friendly to civil liberty have perpe-
trated serious violations. The administration of Franklin D. Roos-
evelt interned Japanese-Americans during World War II. 4 Abraham
Lincoln suspended the right of habeas corpus.5 And Thomas Jef-
ferson was far more of a libertarian as a private citizen than as
President. In office, he countenanced internment camps for polit-
ical suspects, censored books, and authorized unlawful search and
seizure of private property.6
The nation's historic shortcomings do not, of course, detract
from the nobility of the idea of civil liberty embodied by the Bill
of Rights. But they do provide flags of warning to those that think
its aspirations will be easily fulfilled.
Two interrelated tasks remain in order to be able to determine
whether the Bill of Rights is being honored in practice as it is being
celebrated in ceremony during this bicentennial year. The first is
an accounting of the state of our liberties. To do this comprehen-
sively, to complete a true census of the many elements of the rights
and privileges of Americans, would be a daunting task. But it is
not impossible to etch in the highlights, the essentials of the current
state of affairs. This I shall try to do. But another requirement
must be met to do the job properly. Logically, a theory first must
provide a framework, to give meaning to the accounting.
The framework I have chosen is a metaphor-the metaphor of
a tree, one of the loveliest sights on earth, one that we view daily,
one that we have reason to understand and appreciate. The tree of
liberty is a concept that goes back to the time of the Revolution.
In this perspective, a tree is not merely a thing of beauty but also
a functioning organism. It is composed of roots that go deep into
the ground, that soak up the nourishment needed to sustain life.
4 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
1 See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867); Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas.
144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).




A tree also contains branches, the large and small leaders that soar
to the heavens and give definition to the hulking trunk. And finally,
a tree has foliage, the myriad leaves that soak up the rays of the
sun and provide shade and protection for all below.
Let me now try to adapt the arboreal metaphor to the law and
politics of the Bill of Rights. Just as the roots of any tree draw
nourishment from soil composed centuries and millennia ago, the
soil on which the tree of liberty rests also goes "deep" to ancient
times.
The first recorded use of the word "freedom" apparently ap-
peared in the twenty-fourth century B.C., when a monarch of
Sumeria "established the freedom" of his subjects by purging tax
collectors, protecting widows and orphans from injustice from
"men of power," and ending the high priest's practice of enslaving
temple servants. 7 Much later, the city-state of Athens made a major
contribution to civil liberty. In the sixth century B.C., the magis-
trate Solon produced a constitution that, while falling short of
full-blown democracy, gave the poor the right to vote and to call
public officials to account. Solon also is credited with first express-
ing the idea of the rule of law. But Athens accepted slavery and
knew no limits on the power of the majority to adopt any law it
chose. Apparently, the Athenians had no concept of individual
rights against the state. The Stoic philosophers introduced the idea
of "natural law" and the derivative concept of equality. Again
excluding slaves and also women, all Athenian citizens were equal
because all possessed reason and owed a common duty to the law
of nature.'
The Romans also contributed to civil liberties through a rudi-
mentary separation of governmental powers and later by the elab-
oration of the nature of law. Justinian's Institutes, for example,
recite: "Justice is the fixed and constant purpose that gives every
man his due." 9 Nevertheless, the Roman emperors were autocratic
in practice. There were no enforceable rights, and censorship,
restrictions on travel and coerced religion flourished.
The history of the Middle Ages contains little evidence of civil
liberties. But the idea of a pure natural law was carried forward
in St. Augustine's City of God and especially Thomas Aquinas's
7 See GEORGES Roux, ANcrENT IRAQ 133 (1980).
9 See Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 153-57 (1928-29).
9 J. INST. l.l.pr.
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Summa Theologica. On the secular side, the contract between
feudal lords and their vassals established reciprocal rights and
responsibilities whose interpretation, in some places, was decided
by a primitive jury drawn from the local community.
The first of the many English antecedents of civil liberties is
the Magna Charta of 1215, the first written instrument in world
history to exact from a monarch a promise to obey certain rules.
This document was violated by some English kings and was cer-
tainly not intended as a manifesto of popular rights. Nevertheless,
among the basic liberties derivable from it are the security of
private property and of the person, the right to judgment by one's
peers, the right to seek redress of grievances from the sovereign,
and the concept of due process of law. Above all, as Winston
Churchill said, the Magna Charta "justifies the respect in which
men have held it" because it tells us there is "a law above the
king." 10
The second great charter of English liberty was the 1628 Peti-
tion of Right, a statute asserting the freedom of the people from
unconsented taxation and arbitrary imprisonment." The third was
the English Bill of Rights, enacted in 1689. It declared that elections
to Parliament should be free and that members ought not be
punished for their speeches in debate. In addition, it condemned
the last Stuart Kings' perversions of criminal justice, including
excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments. 12
The American colonies also contributed to the development of
civil liberties. The first colonial charter, Virginia's in 1606, reserved
to the inhabitants "[a]ll liberties, Franchises, and Immunities...
as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realm of
England.'' 3 The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 expressed
in detail a range of fundamental rights, 4 many of which were
adopted in the American Bill of Rights. Other colonial charters,
notably Pennsylvania's,'5 were also influential in protecting indi-
1 1 B RNARD ScHwARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 7 (1971)
(quoting Churchill).
" See Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Charles I, c. 1, reprinted in I Documrs ON
FUNDAMENTAL HuMAN RIGHTS, 256 (Zechariah Chafee, Jr. ed., 1963).
,2 See Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 William & Mary, St. 2, c. 2, reprinted in I DOCUMENTS
ON FUNDAMENTAL HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 267.
,1 First Charter of Virginia art. XV (1606), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMEN-
TAL HUmAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 97.
"4 See Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641), reprinted in I DOCUMENTS ON FUNDA-
MENTAL HUmAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 122.
11 Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania (1680-81), reprinted in I DOCUMENTS ON
F DAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 157.
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vidual rights. In addition, a New York jury's acquittal in 1735 of
the publisher Peter Zenger on a charge of seditious libel (that is,
defaming the government) was a milestone in securing the freedom
of the press.16
Such is a short description of the soil in which the American
tree of liberty is planted. What are the roots themselves? In my
view there are three. The first is the system of separation of powers
in the national government, the division of authority among the
executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments. This divi-
sion is crucial; the Framers of the Constitution understopd, antic-
ipating Lord Acton's famous statement that absolute power corrupts
absolutely, the importance of dispersing the authority of govern-
ment. As the Supreme Court said in 1874, the "theory of our
governments, State and National, is opposed to the deposit of
unlimited power anywhere." 17 Separation of powers is especially
valuable in assuring that the courts not lose their independence as
a result of domination by the politically elected branches of gov-
ernment.
A second root of American liberty is the First Amendment
guaranty of free speech and press. Without this right, citizens could
not criticize government and other centers of authority. Conse-
quently, there would be no capacity to expose, debate, and cure
problems. Other countries bear tragic witness that freedom of
expression is needed to grope toward the truth in public affairs, to
assure democratic government, to check arbitrary officials, and to
permit individual expression without fear of retaliation.
The third and final root of American liberty is the system of
judicial review. The power of lifetime judges, insulated from elec-
toral politics, to declare invalid the acts of legislators and executive
officials is the enforcement mechanism that vivifies the Bill of
Rights as well as the entire Constitution. Imagine the sort of
country this would be if the scores, perhaps hundreds, of laws that
have been declared invalid under the Bill of Rights were still the
law of the land.
These three doctrines, separation of powers, free expression,
and judicial review, are the cornerstones, the roots of the Bill of
Rights. Without them, the American people would be subject to
unqualified majoritarianism at the cost of liberty. Ours would be
16 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THm PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFER-
SON 3-44 (1966).
11 Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 655, 663 (1874).
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a system in which fifty-one percent of the voters could take any
desired action against minorities that they pleased.
How are these doctrines faring at bicentennial time? Are they
in good health?
My colleague Burt Neuborne argues persuasively that "the
contemporary doctrine of separation of powers respects neither
'powers' nor 'separation' [and] has resulted in a political implosion
that threatens to alter the fundamental structure of our govern-
ment."18 But with the exception of the fact that, contrary to the
expectations of the Framers, the Executive branch has come to
dominate Congress, the recent alterations in the doctrine do not
seem to me to severely threaten civil liberty. And even the ascen-
dancy of the Executive, which traces at least to the New Deal, can
be cured, or at least mitigated, by resolute political efforts.
The same cannot confidently be said about free expression;
that root is frayed in at least three areas. The first is national
security. The Court made a promising start in the Pentagon Papers
case,19 when it rejected an attempt to enjoin publication of classi-
fied documents concerning the origins of the Vietnam War. Since
then, however, the Court has regularly sacrificed First Amendment
principles by upholding the denial of a visa to enter the United
States to a foreign professor whose views were regarded as "Com-
munist,"' 2 by permitting the CIA to require all former employees
to submit all their future writings for agency review before publi-
cation,21 and by other means. 22
Free expression also has been impaired in its interaction with
the modern administrative state. For example, the Supreme Court
shocked a large part of the country by holding recently that a
physician working in a family planning agency financed in part by
the federal government could be barred from advising patients of
the possibility of an abortion to terminate an unwanted preg-
nancy.2 This is not the occasion to discuss why the decision rep-
resents a low watermark in judicial sensitivity to free speech and
to the historic responsibilities of a physician to counsel patients
1S Burt Neuborne, In Praise of Seventh-Grade Civics: A Plea for Stricter Adherence
to Separation of Powers, 26 LAND & WATER L. REv. 385, 401 (1991).
"1 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
21 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
See generally Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 840 (1989).
2 See Rust v. Sullivan, - U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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completely.24 It is enough here to note that one of the decision's
ominous implications almost was realized several months later when
the House of Representatives voted to deny subsidies, otherwise
available, to artists and museums for works that are "patently
offensive" in their sexual explicitness. A disaster for the First
Amendment was narrowly averted when, at the eleventh hour, the
provision was dropped through political compromise in a House-
Senate conference committee.25
A third area where danger signals are evident also is related to
the arts. The Supreme Court, last term, upheld an Indiana statute
banning public nudity as applied to erotic dancing that was not
"obscene" and thus, as the Court admitted, entitled to First
Amendment protection.26 The restriction was justified by the gov-
ernment's interest in "societal order and morality, '"27 an elastic
standard with no inherent bounds in the absence of a showing of
physical disorder.
The third root of American liberty-judicial review, tracing to
Marbury v. Madison28-is alive but not vibrant. An indispensable
aspect of judicial review is the ability of people to gain adequate
access to the courts to challenge government action they believe
unconstitutional. In recent years, in a variety of cases, the Court
has used the doctrine of standing to bar litigants from obtaining
decisions on the merits of their claims. Thus, for example, the
budget of the CIA has remained secret, 29 and racist public housing
projects have been insulated from judicial review. 30 Last term the
Supreme Court sharply limited the scope of habeas corpus for
incarcerated individuals seeking relief in federal courts,3' and a bill
was presented to Congress, supported by the President, to curtail
the further availability of the writ.32 These are not good omens.
Having discussed the roots, we now need to consider the
branches of the tree of American liberty. Without branches, a tree
24 See generally Sylvia Law & Rachael Pine, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive
Rights: Strategies for Making the Dream Real, 27 HLv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. -(Summer
1992). Congress passed a bill in late 1991 that would have authorized physicians to counsel
patients on abortion in government financed clinics. But, President Bush vetoed the law
and, by a margin of 12 votes, the House of Representatives sustained the veto.
11 See Kim Masters, "Corn for Porn" Victory, WASH. PosT, Oct. 25, 1991, at B2.
16 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., - U.S. , II S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
27 Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
2 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
29 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
30 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
" See Coleman v. Thompson, - U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
32 See S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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is fatally deficient. So it was with the Constitution and Bill of
Rights in the eighteenth century. A crucial ingredient was absent,
the concept of equality. In a commentary on the bicentennial of
the Constitution, Thurgood Marshall pointed out that when the
Founders used the phrase "We the People" in the Preamble to the
Constitution, "they did not have in mind the majority of America's
citizens"
It took a bloody and embittering Civil War to place a stricken
nation on the road to rectification. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments provide the first branch to our tree-
the outlawing of slavery and racial discrimination in voting and
the general protection of equality. The march to full racial parity
has been slow and frustrating, but progress was made in the century
following these Amendments. Similarly, we have advanced from
the paternalistic attitude that prevailed in 1873, when a Supreme
Court Justice could say that "the divine ordinance, as well as...
the nature of things" made "the female sex unfit for many of the
occupations of civil life" and consigned women to the "benign
offices of wife and mother. ' 34 Again it took a century, but by
1973 women long since had been given the right to vote,35 and the
Supreme Court had begun the process of subjecting sex discrimi-
nation to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.36
Thus did a second branch grow on the tree of liberty.
And other branches have appeared. The rights of nonmarital
children, noncitizens, the mentally ill, and the elderly have received
some form of special protection through judicial action, legislative
action, or a combination of both.37
How sturdy are these branches? The answer varies, but in my
view there is no cause to rejoice. To start with race, despite the
undoubted and visible progress achieved, inter-group relations in
many parts of the United States today are worse than they have
been for some years. Legal doctrine in several Supreme Court
3' Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (noting that originally the Constitution provided neither
Negro slaves nor women the right to vote).
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
"s U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIX (ratified in 1920).
m See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (nonmarital children); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (mentally retarded); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § 621-634 (1985) (older workers).
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decisions reflects this. The recent rulings that undercut strong
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws" had to be reversed by
Congress.3 9 Moreover, mounting evidence indicates that an increas-
ing number of Americans are unsympathetic to racial minorities
and unwilling to act on altruistic or kindly impulses. The success
of former Klansman and Nazi sympathizer David Duke in the
Louisiana gubernatorial primary is an extreme symptom of the
phenomenon. 4° After a decade of shameless greed and corruption
on Wall Street and elsewhere, in which self-gratification has been
the prevailing ethic, the trend is not surprising. At such a time,
leadership is needed to galvanize public opinion to empathy for
the concerns of minorities. But we have had exactly the opposite,
exemplified most recently by the almost desperate attempt by the
President to thwart passage of a civil rights bill, any civil rights
bill, even one acceptable to Senator John Danforth, not previously
known as a Radical Republican. It is clear that this branch of the
liberty tree needs renewed support.
As for discrimination against women, as already indicated,
some of the grosser problems have been addressed. Still, sizable
barriers exist for women seeking many sorts of employment. Wom-
en's earnings remain below men's, and their representation in
prominent positions in government, universities, and business con-
tinues to be low.41 In this connection, we all saw on television the
starkly different ways in which the Senate Judiciary Committee
treated Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill, man and woman. He was
treated with unfailing respect; she was savaged by the Republicans
and undefended by the Democrats. Wholly apart from who was
telling the truth or whether Clarence Thomas should be sitting on
the Supreme Court, the scenario provided a vivid and unforgettable
exhibition of a double standard at work.
A third and especially vulnerable branch of the liberty tree
relates to homosexuals. In view of the deep and long-standing
prejudice against lesbians and gay men, it was not surprising, but
nevertheless deplorable, that the Supreme Court rejected a consti-
1, See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 624 (1989); Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
39 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
- Even in communities where there are few racial minorities and no history of racial
strife, severe problems have arisen. See, e.g., Isabel Wilkerson, Seeking a Racial Mix,
Dubuque Finds Tension, N.Y. Trams, Nov. 3, 1991, at Al.




tutional challenge to sodomy laws. 42 That decision was a dramatic
reflection of the web of discrimination that surrounds homosexuals
in employment, housing, family life, and in the street. Millions of
homosexual Americans try to live quiet and productive lives. Until
the law and the mass of people come to terms with the virulent
discrimination against them, the equality branch of our constitu-
tional heritage will not be healthy.
The final branch on the tree to which I shall refer is a different
sort of limb. Although it also addresses a problem of equality, it
relates to equal justice with regard to state law. In 1833, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights applied only to viol-
ations by the United States because it was this entity that the
framers feared as a threat to liberty. 43 After the Civil War, there
was a long struggle over whether the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quired a different result. The Supreme Court eventually held that
it did, with three exceptions: the right to bear arms, the right to
an indictment by a grand jury, and the right to a civil trial byjury.44
The result is that individuals are now generally protected by
the same Constitution against all improper behavior by govern-
ment, whether local, state, or national. This, of course, makes
perfect sense if the United States is to be "a more perfect Union,"
as the Preamble to the Constitution declares.
I turn now to the foliage on our tree of liberty. Leaves are not
part of a tree's permanent structure, but they are necessary to its
existence; dead trees do not have leaves. Our liberty tree also has
foliage-elements of individual freedom that were not part of the
original Constitution (the roots) or its subsequent textual growth
through amendments (the branches). These non-textual rights-
what I am calling the foliage-are no less important to the organ-
ism of liberty in our country.
The first of these is the right to travel. It is curious that
although the Articles of Confederation explicitly recognized the
right of the people of each state (except for paupers, fugitives and
vagabonds) to "have free ingress and regress tio and from any
other State," 45 no such provision appears in the Constitution or
2 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
•' See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
" See generally GEOFFREY R. SToNr Er AL., CoNsrrTrroNAL LAW 777-786 (2d ed.
1991).
, ARTICLES OF CorN mEATioN art. IV.
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Bill of Rights. In fact, in its earliest statement on the subject, the
Supreme Court held that a state could require the registration of
passengers entering it from other states.46 By the 1960s, however,
the Court could say that the right to travel "has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized." 47 The right has been vari-
ously located-as a structural provision, 41 in the Article IV Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, 49 in the Due Process Clause,50 in the
First Amendment, 51 and even in the Commerce Clause.5 2 In one
broad 1966 ruling, the Court upheld the application of provisions
of civil rights laws to private individuals that attempted to deprive
black persons of the right to use public facilities while traveling
interstate.53
The right to travel, our first burst of foliage, is well established
and in generally good color. But complacency is not warranted;
we have learned that the government has the power to prevent
travel to certain countries54 and to strip Americans of their pass-
ports if their activities are causing or "are likely to cause serious
damage to... national security or foreign policy."5 5 With the end
of the Cold War, it is hoped that people will soon be as free to
travel to other countries as they are between states. But even
interstate travel is not wholly secure. The Supreme Court may soon
decide whether groups opposed to abortion can prevent pregnant
women from going to a neighboring state for an abortion. 6 If such
travel can be prevented, what other forms of mobility may be
impaired by vigilantes intent on other holy objectives?
The second sort of foliage decorating the tree of liberty is
freedom of association. It too is not enunciated in the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court unanimously recognized the right
4 See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); see also The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
' United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
,See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-562 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)
(Washington, J., on circuit).
" See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
31 See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
52 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
" United States v. Guest, supra note 47.
4 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
11 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 303 (1981).
m See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991);
cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-106 (1971).
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in 1958 when, in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,57
some southern states sought to destroy civil rights organizations.
When Alabama ordered the NAACP to disclose its list of members,
the Court held that the First Amendment protected the confiden-
tiality of the names because "[i]nviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to pres-
ervation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs." 58
Paradoxically, this decision followed by only a few years the
prosecution and blacklisting of Americans that were or were be-
lieved to be leaders or simply members of the Communist Party.5 9
The freedom of association did not help them. Happily, with the
appropriate exception of situations where a large association is
used to perpetuate racial or sexual discrimination, the trend in
recent years has been to broaden associational rights. But here too
ominous signs appear. Only by a 5-4 vote did the Supreme Court
hold in 1990 that the government violated freedom of association
by basing promotions, transfers, or recalls of its employees on their
political affiliation. 60 If this decision is overruled as a result of
changes in the composition of the Court, political orthodoxy could
determine who can hold government employment in some parts of
the country. Moreover, some of the older cases that were antago-
nistic to free association have not been overruled but merely dis-
tinguished, leaving the door ajar for their possible reentry into the
main stream of constitutional law.
A third form of foliage is the right of sexual privacy, which
the Supreme Court first acknowledged in 1965 by ruling that a
state could not make it a crime for married couples to use contra-
ceptives. 61 The principle soon was extended to single people. 62 The
natural culmination of these rulings was Roe v. Wade,63 which
allowed women to determine the procreative direction of their lives
free from state control. How glorious the leaves on the tree of
57 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
-" NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
19 See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951). These cases subsequently were limited or substantially overruled. See
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957).
- Rutan v. Republican Party, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990); see also Branti
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
61 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
- 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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liberty looked on that day in January 1973. But we all know the
sequel, how case by case the Supreme Court has upheld state laws
that have chipped away at the sexual privacy and autonomy that
Roe v. Wade embodied 4 Today, a strong possibility, even a like-
lihood, exists that the leaves representing free choice will be stripped
from their branches. This has not been the only recent loss in this
sphere. The decision referred to above denying homosexuals the
right to engage in adult consensual sex was as much an affront to
the non-textual foliage of privacy as it was to the textual branch
of equality. Fear is justified for the survival of this part of our
tree's anatomy.
The extent of this affront to liberty may be better grasped when
it is recognized that the first and to this day unsurpassed judicial
statement of the right to sexual privacy came from Justice John
Marshall Harlan, a leading conservative. In Poe v. Ullman,65 Har-
lan protested eloquently at the Court's refusal to decide then and
there that a married couple had a constitutional right to use con-
traceptives. Harlan located the right in the liberty portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but the critical fact
is that he went well beyond accepted textual interpretations of the
Constitution. 6 How stunned Harlan would have been to be told
that his judgment was flawed because the Framers did not have
the "original intent" to protect sexual privacy or that these words
could not be found in the text of the Constitution. Not coinciden-
tally, I believe, it was Justice Harlan who wrote the opinion in
NAACP v. Alabama,6 7 which first recognized the freedom of as-
sociation. He was aware that the foliage of non-textual constitu-
tional decision making was sometimes needed to complete the tree
of liberty.
The fourth and final portion of the tree's foliage is the right
to vote. Contemporary Americans find it difficult to believe that
the Founders of the greatest democracy in the world did not include
a right of citizen participation in the electoral process. The Con-
stitution established certain qualifications for the offices of Presi-
dent, Vice-President, Senator and Representative. It also established
" See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 521-22 ("The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And
the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its
protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted constitutional right.").
67 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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the Electoral College for the selection of the President and Vice-
President, provided for election of Senators by state legislatures,
and declared that those electing members of the House of Repre-
sentatives shall meet the same qualifications as "electors of the
most numerous branch of the State Legislature."" But only white,
propertied males were allowed to vote at the time. Constitutional
amendments were needed to enfranchise women, African-Ameri-
cans and young people 18 years of age or older.6 9
In recent years, the Supreme Court, relying mainly on the
Fourteenth Amendment, without expressly declaring a general right
to vote, has invalidated state laws that imposed poll taxes,70 unrea-
sonable residence requirements,71 discriminatory literacy tests, 72 and
voting districts with unequal populations.7 3 Although a number of
dubious requirements are still on the books, the foliage of voting
rights remains relatively healthy. This is a cause for celebration,
but it is sobering to recall that anything close to full suffrage in
the United States was delayed until the 1970s, indeed, almost to
the 1976 bicentennial of the Declaration of Independence, with its
thrilling but premature assertion that "all men are created equal."
It is now time to come to terms with the evidence at hand, to
reach some conclusions about the question with which this discus-
sion began. Should we celebrate the bicentennial of the Bill of
Rights with enthusiasm, concern, or perhaps both? We should, of
course, have enthusiasm for the document itself, for the concept
and principles it embodies, for those who produced it, for those
who have labored for its fulfillment, and for the considerable
successes that they have had. Yet, it is with something less than
full enthusiasm that, to be honest, we must face the reality of the
Bill of Rights in contemporary America. I hope I have not exag-
" U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, ci. 1.
U.S. CoNsT. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI.
70 See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see also U.S.
CONsT. amend. XXIV.
1' See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S.
679 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that an Arizona law requiring voters to register at least 50
days prior to the day of election was a constitutional means for promoting accurate voter
registration lists); Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that a
Georgia 50 day advance registration law was a constitutional means of promoting accurate
voter registration lists).
,2 See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 152 (1965); see also South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (enforcing congressional authority to suspend literacy
tests where use of such tests has coincided with low voter participation).
13 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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gerated the problems, but it is difficult for me to avoid the con-
clusion that the tree of liberty is not in exuberant health. Roots,
branches, and foliage are weak or under stress. As Justice Harry
Blackmun wrote recently, "[A] chill wind blows." 7 4
If this is true, what is to be done? One appropriate reaction is
to turn with new energy and imagination to the government insti-
tutions responsible for protecting our liberties. In the past, the
United States Supreme Court was the main such institution. As
James Madison said in proposing the Bill of Rights, "Independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights." 7 5 Our courts have often done nobly,
but it would be a rash person who today looked confidently to the
Supreme Court, the apex of the judiciary, as the special guardian
of our rights.
We might, of course, turn to other institutions of government
to bolster the tree. Indeed, there are many experienced and able
persons who believe reliance on courts has been excessive. For
example, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson shortly before his
death in 1954, said: "I know of no modern instance in which any
judiciary has saved a whole people from the great currents of
intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have threat-
ened liberty and free institutions .... ",76 If this is true and courts
are neither omnipotent nor especially receptive to claims of liberty,
to which government institutions can we turn? The executive branch
in recent years has been of no help in securing civil liberty. Con-
gress has been somewhat better, but the need to compromise with
anti-libertarian elements and an unreceptive President has sapped
its effectiveness. More promising, in some places, are institutions
of state government. For example, many state courts, relying on
their own constitutions, have picked up the slack and afforded
their citizens protection well beyond that currently provided by the
United States Constitution and Supreme Court.77
74 Webster, 492 U.S. at 560 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was refer-
ring to the threat to the right of women to "retain the liberty to control their destinies."
Id. But the point is applicable to the status of civil liberties generally.
11 2 ScHwA Tz, supra note 10, at 1009 (quoting Madison).
76 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SuPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYsTEM OF GovERN-
MNTh 80 (1955). This may overstate the point because courts, although unable to save "a
whole people," may assist the people in preserving numerous elements of liberty that
together make up a free society. For a perceptive discussion of the role of institutions other
than courts in protecting individual rights, see Frederick A.D. Schwarz, The Constitution
Outside the Court, 47 Rec. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (1992) (forthcoming).
7 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival
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Yes, all of these institutions are potential if limited saviors.
But my final thought is that perhaps too much reliance is being
placed on official institutions and not enough on the actions of
individuals in securing and defending rights. At various times of
crisis, we have seen government institutions subverted and the
words of the Constitution and Bill of Rights reduced to "mere
paper affirmations," as a British scholar described them a century
ago. 78
This means that the tree of liberty requires constant watering
and care by the people. The Bill of Rights was not designed as an
abstraction. If it were, the rights it contains would have no more
value than the barren promises entombed in the constitutions of
many totalitarian countries. Rights must be exercised and respected,
or they will atrophy.
Private individuals, that means all of us, in the last analysis
are the gardeners and pruners of the tree of liberty, the principal
bulwark of our liberties. It is not an easy task, but private insti-
tutions, of which there are many, can help us. I am of course most
familiar with the American Civil Liberties Union. It is imperative
to recognize that the ACLU is important to public life, but not
because anyone agrees with every position it takes.79 I can say with
confidence that neither I nor any of the other leaders of the
organization did so during all the years there. No, the reason to
support the ACLU is that, with other groups, it struggles to give
meaning to the Bill of Rights, to act as a nonpartisan counterweight
to arbitrary government. And it is not only liberal organizations
that deserve credit for such actions; for example, the Business
Roundtable, a conservative coalition of business leaders, attempted
to play a constructive role in fashioning the 1991 civil rights law.
Further, we should recall that those who drafted and approved the
Bill of Rights were for the most part conservative, seeking to
preserve islands of individual autonomy from government control
and to hold government to standards of fairness and evenhanded-
ness in dealings with its citizens.
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986);
see also Steven A. Holmes, Frustrated by Federal Courts, A.C.L.U. Looks to States on
Individual Rights, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 20, 1991, at 14.
78 See ALBERT V. Dicat, THE LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION 341 (Ist ed. 1885).
7 See generally SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LmERTms: A HISTORY OF
THE ACLU (1990) (detailing numerous issues since founding of ACLU in 1920 in which
there was substantial division *ithin the organization).
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Unfortunately, too many of today's "conservatives" are not
conserving the principles and values of the Bill of Rights, but are
undermining them. Religious fundamentalists, insensitive to the
teachings of the Constitution, often lead the onslaught.
The problem does not stem from the tenets of Christianity,
especially the humanitarianism and altruism of the Sermon on the
Mount. It is, rather, the zealotry of some of its modern leaders,
who not only want their children to pray in school, they want
everyone's to do so. They not only want to prevent fundamentalist
women from choosing to seek an abortion, they want to deny every
woman this choice. They not only want their children to learn
"scientific creationism" as an alternative to science, they want
every child to learn it. They not only want to decide which books
their children cannot read, they want to decide for all children.
They not only want to spend their own money on church schools,
they want everyone to be taxed for this purpose.
In summary, after surveying the American scene in the bicen-
tennial year of 1991, my conclusion is that the tree of liberty stands
but does not stand tall and straight. We must try harder to fulfill
its promise. Those who dedicate themselves to this task, to assuring
the health of the tree of liberty, are engaged in work that is often
thankless and reviled. Strong opponents have invoked the slogans
of necessity, patriotism, and morality in the course of undermining
liberty and dominating people who are weak, unorthodox, and
unpopular. Government efficiency, international influence, domes-
tic order, and economic strength are all important in a dangerous
and complex world. Yet, none of these is of greater consequence
than the principles of freedom and human dignity embodied in the
Bill of Rights, our country's proudest heritage, our tree of liberty. 0
,0 This paper does not purport to deal with all human rights problems confronting
the nation in its bicentennial year. Three important unresolved issues as 1991 drew to a
close were the deepening plight of the poor and homeless, see States Slashed Aid to Poor
in 1991, Report Says, N.Y. Tnms, Dec. 19, 1991, at A28; the inadequacies and increasing
cost of the health care system, see Walt Bogdanich, Divided Panel Rejects Revamp of
Health Care, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1991, at B4; and, the persistent crime problem, including
the failure of inner city court systems to grapple with the case load and dispense justice,
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